

AMERICAN TARIFF LAWS.

VIII—THE CLAY COMPROMISE.

By FREDERIC J. HASKIN.

When the second session of the Twenty-second Congress met, in December, 1832, the free traders were ready to lop off forthwith every protective duty in the tariff of the previous spring. A bill embodying this principle was early brought into the House. Its appearance there was the signal for one of the most dramatic of all the battles that have been waged in the long continuing struggle between the protectionists and the free traders. The protectionists, however, they resolved to stand like the Spartans at Thermopylae. They were angered to think that the action of a single State could overturn their favorite policy, just as Mr. Roosevelt was angered when California threatened, by her individual action, to precipitate trouble with Japan over the protection of the advocates of revision of being wronged before the State of South Carolina.

The low tariff people promptly resented the implication. They pointed to the fact that seven of the States had already voted to put an end to protection, two of them the New England States of Maine and New Hampshire. Their spokesmen asserted that it was neither right nor just that taxes should be imposed on States which believed them to be oppressive and unconstitutional.

After a prolonged debate on the bill reported to the House, it was found that it could not muster the necessary strength for passage. Then numerous other propositions were brought forth, but they suffered a like lack of strength. At last a motion was made by a Kentucky member that all after the enacting clause be stricken out, and that in lieu thereof be substituted the bill drafted by Senator Clay, which, it was understood, could pass almost at once and passed the House with a substantial margin.

This bill had previously been introduced in the Senate by Mr. Clay, "in the hope," perhaps vain hope—of reconciling conflicting opinions in this country on the subject to which it related. The bill was drawn to be a protective tariff that leads to ultimate free trade, and provided for a gradual reduction of duties until 1842, when the last vestige of protection should be wiped off the statute books and a complete tariff for revenue only should then take its place. The first reduction was not to take place until nine months after the approval of the measure, and all duties were to be brought down to a horizontal level of 20 per cent by such gradual steps that it would require nine years to complete the reductions, thus giving every manufacturer a chance to adjust himself to the new conditions.

The measure was unique among tariff measures in that it sought to tie the hands of future Congresses. In the years that followed the plea was frequently heard that the act amounted to an inviolable promise by Congress to abide by that measure, and that to interfere with it, even to repeal the odious salt tax, would involve bad faith on the part of the national legislature.

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He said he felt that the manufacturers' measure exacted from them in exchange for the nine and a half years of legislative peace and certainty they were to enjoy. As to the assertion that he was led to frame the bill by the nullification acts, he said that so long as South Carolina threatened by force to oppose the laws of the nation, he had no alternative but to take such measures, but since he found that she meant only to try to accomplish her ends by law, and not by the sword, there was no longer necessity for harshness. While he thought the experiment was a rash, impetuous, and even dangerous one, still it was time for reconciliation and not for extreme measures. He now believed that South Carolina had been putting up her fists merely to see what the United States would do about it, and with that view in mind he could no longer see that he was yielding in the face of threats when he conceded all he could to the Palmetto State.

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But if Clay was inconsistent, there were others not less so. Daniel Webster had been the father of the argument that protection was unconstitutional. He had elaborated that doctrine in a speech in 1820, and had given it all the vitality it possessed. Yet he was now as firmly convinced of the constitutionality of protection as he had been of its unconstitutionality before. He attributed his change of heart to some letters that had been written by James Madison. John C. Calhoun was standing shoulder to shoulder with Clay on the measure. Here were two men of opposing schools of political thought, with views as variant as the poles on all matters of governmental policy, finding common ground upon which to fight. To the ultra free traders it looked as if Calhoun had deserted his camp, and to the protectionists of the Simon-pure, noncompromising kind, it looked that Clay had made a complete about face.

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were less than \$5,000,000. But there was always danger of large losses, and the consumer expected to have to pay the tax, so it was decided to require cash payments after 1842.

Things went pretty well under the Clay compromise for some years. Then came that era of speculation and high finance which resulted in the panic of 1857. If we are to believe such statements as Clay and Webster, that panic was brought about by the over-straining of credits, just as the one of 1897 was precipitated. At the same time, there was much high finance played by the government which helped along the financial disturbance. There were some people then, as there are now, who believed that the lowering of the tariff under the Clay compromise was responsible for it. In this connection, it is interesting to note that up to this time the reductions of the tariff had amounted to but very little, and would amount to but little more in the next two years. Taking the whole of the fiscal year 1857, it amounted to but 6 per cent, as compared with the act of 1852. At the time of the convulsion of 1857 only two-tenths of the excess of duties over 20 per cent had been taken off.

After the first flush of the panic it was proposed to change the tariff as provided under the Clay compromise. Mr. Clay promptly declared that he would oppose, "so far as my voice and vote can go, this disturbance of the compromise arrangement, made in March, 1852, under which the country has flourished so happily." Daniel Webster had fought the compromise with might and main, and had utterly rejected the doctrine, that it was even morally binding upon future Congresses. It is, therefore, not without significance that he absolved the tariff from blame in bringing about the panic of 1857. In a speech, printed in Niles' Register, he said:

"No doubt we shall hear every cause but the true one assigned for the present distress. It will be laid to the opposition in and out of Congress, it will be laid to the tariff, it will be laid to the merchants, it will be laid to the manufacturers, it will be laid to the tariff, it will be laid to the north star, or to the malign influence of the last comet whose tail swept near to or across the orbit of this earth of ours, before we shall be allowed to sacrifice it. It is just, mainly, cause, tampering with the currency, and an attempt to stretch Executive power over a subject not constitutionally within its reach."

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To-morrow—American Tariff Laws. IX—Why Tariff of 1842.

SAYINGS OF MRS. SOLOMON.

Being the Confessions of the Seven Hundredth Wife.

Translated by Helen Rowland.

Behold, my beloved, by these signs shall you know a gentleman, which is the prince of men and the fair prince of lovers.

Lo! before a gentleman kisseth thee he saith: "I love thee!" Yes, he lieth beautifully and perjureth himself nobly. And his kiss is not as wormwood and gall, but as a graceful complement.

And after he kisseth thee he murmureth: "Nay, be not sorry; neither regret what thou hast done, for it was all my fault. Yes, I know thou dost not this thing with others, for thou art not 'that kind' of a girl. And I respect and admire thee more than ever—yet I shall kiss thee many times again."

But a cad saith: "Why didst thou let me kiss thee? Lo! thou leavest me!" Yes, thou didst tempt me and thou art to blame. But, since thou regrettest it, I shall not kiss thee again." For he hath got the kiss. And when he departeth he muttereth unto himself: "Go to! This is a habit with her, and I am but one of many—yet she is a good actress."

Then judge not a gentleman by the way in which he boweth or shaketh hands, neither by his accent, but by the way in which he speaketh of other women. For of her from whom he hath escaped he saith always: "She was an old sweetheart of mine—and I thought her adorable! Yes, I was foolish about her." But the cad saith: "Nay, she was never anything to me—for that was just a passing flirtation."

Verily, verily, before a seat in the first balcony beside a man who converseth with thee between the acts, than an orchestra, still beside one that climbeth out for a drink when the curtain falleth; yes, better a dinner with red ink opposite a man that keepeth his eyes admiringly upon thee than champagne and French dishes opposite one that casteth covert glances at every other pretty woman in the room; better a ride in a "pay-as-you-enter car" with a man who playeth the devoted than a whirl in a taxicab with one who yaweth behind his sleeve.

For an Ascot tie and a broad "A" and a silk hat cannot disguise a cad. Go to! Nine tailors may make a man, but they cannot make a gentleman. Selah!

Verily, verily, before a seat in the first balcony beside a man who converseth with thee between the acts, than an orchestra, still beside one that climbeth out for a drink when the curtain falleth; yes, better a dinner with red ink opposite a man that keepeth his eyes admiringly upon thee than champagne and French dishes opposite one that casteth covert glances at every other pretty woman in the room; better a ride in a "pay-as-you-enter car" with a man who playeth the devoted than a whirl in a taxicab with one who yaweth behind his sleeve.

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CONVERT ARDENTLY

EXTLS HIS FAITH

Catholic Priest Tells of His New Light.

ONCE EPISCOPALIAN MINISTER

Rev. Father Doran Addresses Huge Congregation in the Shrine of the Sacred Heart Last Evening—Relates Basis of His Faith in the Roman Catholic Church.

A convert to Catholicism spoke with profound ardor in the Shrine of the Sacred Heart last evening. He told of the faith he had espoused, the manner of doctrine he had taken, after a long period of Christian stewardship in other fields. Hundreds stormed the doors to hear his story, but were thrown back from an edifice already packed beyond capacity.

The convert was Rev. Father Alvah Doran, former "high church" Episcopalian and now, by self-conversion, a member of the Catholic priesthood. In the latter field he declares he has found "peace of mind" and the "one united